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Capping Deforestation Emissions in Developing
Countries Equitably and Effectively
Daniel Watts
INTRODUCTION
As negotiators from 192 nations gathered in Copenhagen, December
2009, fifty-six of the world’s newspapers published an urgent editorial in
forty-five different countries.1 The editorial called for “decisive action” on
climate change, and admonished participating nations “not to hesitate, not
to fall into dispute, not to blame each other but to seize opportunity from the
greatest modern failure of politics.”2 The editorial soberly cautioned that
failure to reach consensus “would parch continents, turning farmland into
desert. Half of all species would become extinct, untold millions of people
would be displaced, whole nations would be drowned by the sea.”3
The conference in Copenhagen is now largely recognized as a failure.4 In
the words of the former executive secretary of the United Nation’s
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), “the window of
opportunity that we have to come to grips with this issue is closing faster
than it was before.”5 This reflects the ossified patterns of human behavior
and thought that perpetuate climate change6 and illustrates that the shift to a
low-carbon economy will require massive thawing of crystallized industrial
forces.
International environmental laws aimed at controlling greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions should seek to improve the relationships between human
groups and their physical, social, and natural environment. Whereas the
policies of environmental effectiveness and environmental justice are
frequently at odds, the reality is that one policy cannot be achieved without
the other. The second Kyoto commitment period will require significant,
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binding agreements from both developed and developing nations in order to
be effective. But such agreements will not be forthcoming if they are unjust.
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)
is a new UNFCCC program intended to address the growing problem of
GHG emissions caused by deforestation. Deforestation is the second largest
source of anthropogenic GHG emissions, and it is the largest source of
GHG emissions in developing nations.7 Consequently, it is generally
accepted that no meaningful climate change commitment can be achieved
without a REDD program.8 Further, since it is aimed at deforestation
emissions as opposed to industrial emissions,9 REDD is the only plausible
means to bind developing nations to environmentally effective emissions
caps. And binding developing nations to emissions targets will both
dramatically improve the environmental effectiveness of the next climate
change treaty and make the terms more palatable to developed nations like
the United States.
Roughly 20 percent of global GHG emissions are due to deforestation in
developing countries.10 Further, deforestation carries tremendous
environmental consequences aside from GHG emissions. Half of the earth’s
tropical forests are now gone and deforestation marches on at a rate of one
acre per second.11 Deforestation has lead to mass extinction due to loss of
habitat.12 Deforestation has led to outbreaks of mosquito-borne diseases,
such as dengue fever, rift valley fever, and malaria; and deforestation has
led to outbreaks of water-borne diseases, like cholera.13 Deforestation has
also caused the cultural collapse of forest-dependent people by displacing
them from their ancestral homelands.14 Finally, soil degradation and water
shortages due to deforestation greatly contribute to the modern problem of
famine, refugees, failed states, and terrorism.15
The major forces driving deforestation are economic. The inclusion of
emissions trading in the REDD program has the potential to redirect those
economic forces towards more sustainable forestry and conservation. At the
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very least, emissions trading under REDD will alleviate the economic losses
caused by forest conservation in developing countries.
Unfortunately, the existing design of emissions trading under Kyoto
utilizes a “baseline” emissions-capping approach that is unrealistic and
unfair to developing nations.16 Another capping approach, the “carbonstock” method, has been proposed to specifically address REDD emissions
trading.17 The carbon-stock method is more realistic for developing nations,
but it fails to provide an effective incentive to slow the rate of deforestation.
Furthermore, neither capping method accounts for the environmental
services that all nations receive from the preservation of forests.
This article proposes an emissions market design intended to address the
shortcomings of existing proposals. Part I outlines the specific dangers to
human health and prosperity posed by climate change and, in particular, the
dangers of doing little to slow current climate trends. Part II examines
international responses to climate change and the circumstances which have
made it difficult to achieve policies that are both environmentally effective
and environmentally just. Part III describes the principle of Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) which, historically, has been used
to address the gaping social inequities between the nation-stakeholders of
climate change mitigation. In particular, Part III addresses the
misconceptions that have made the principle of CBDR an obstacle to
international consensus. Part IV examines the current avenues by which
rapidly industrializing developing nations may participate in international
efforts to mitigate climate change and the limitations of these avenues. Part
V introduces the REDD initiative, its potential for sweeping change, the
existing market designs proposed to integrate it into emissions trading, and
the flaws of those designs. Part VI outlines my market designs for better
integration of REDD into the emissions-trading market. Finally, I conclude
that, despite many challenges, a just and effective consensus-based,
international solution to climate change can be reached.
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I. CONSEQUENCES: THE STAKES
Every age has its Cassandras.18 But, before now, mankind has never been
capable of disrupting human life and prosperity on a global scale and for
generations hence through sheer inertia and procrastination.
Heat-trapping GHGs are emitted as a result of a wide range of human
activity and natural phenomena occurring around the globe.19 Unlike other
air pollutants, GHGs spread throughout the atmosphere and remain there for
hundreds of years.20 Rising temperatures threaten to upset a myriad of
natural processes that support human and other life all over the globe.21
Therefore, any environmentally effective response to climate change must
be both consensus-based and international in scope.
Global warming will necessarily affect all nations of the world. But the
impact of that effect will differ—sometimes dramatically—among different
nations.22 All estimates point to the conclusion that poorer nations will
suffer disproportionately severe injuries from global warming.23 And, while
wealthy nations are far from insulated, the extent of the U.S. investment in
the second Kyoto commitment period will depend on the nature and extent
of the risks avoided by its participation.
A. Economic Consequences
The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (hereinafter, “the
Stern Review”) is the most comprehensive synthesis of data concerning the
economic impacts of climate change. Furthermore, unlike similar reports,
the Stern Review takes into account the probability of “extreme weather
events” and “threshold effects.”24 The Stern Review indicates that global
temperatures are likely to rise by two to three degrees Celsius within the
next fifty years.25 But temperatures could rise as much as five to six degrees
Celsius due to feedbacks that amplify climate change, such as the release of
GHGs from thawing permafrost.26 Obviously, the scope of the damage
caused by climate change tends to intensify with the extent of the warming.
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With that in mind, it is certain that any rise in global temperatures is
likely to affect the essential components of human life and enterprise
around the world—namely, water, food, health, land, and environment.27
Further, increased temperatures threaten to trigger large-scale events, like
the collapse of Atlantic thermohaline circulation.28 Finally, and certainly the
most difficult to capture through modeling, is the possibility for
environmental damage of one kind to combine with others and thereby
intensify the overall damage. For instance, rising sea levels may displace
millions of people (land), who migrate to an area where they intensify food
shortages (food), and over-stress the septic capacity (water), thereby
increasing diarrheal diseases (health).
Globally, the economic costs of inaction will be the equivalent of a 5
percent loss of GDP now and forever.29 But, again, the distribution of that
economic loss is likely to be disproportionately borne by poorer countries.
In fact, climate change may initially have some positive effects, in terms of
increased food production and decreases in winter mortality at higher
latitudes, where most developed nations are located.30 But these advantages
will disappear as temperatures continue to rise.31 Plus, any increase of
global temperature will increase the number and severity of extreme
weather events, like hurricane Katrina in the United States and the European
heat wave of 2003.32 The costs of climate change in developed nations are
likely to exceed several percent of GDP with the increase of extreme
weather events.33 Further, the uncertain combinations of environmental
damage in developing nations may lead to global political instability and
market contagion, thereby increasing costs for developed nations.34
B. Failed States
Two groups, The Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, track and rank the political wellbeing of nation states
according to twelve indicators.35 The environmentalist Lester R. Brown has
identified alarming trends of freshwater shortages, topsoil degradation, and
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other effects of climate change in the twenty most politically ill nations.36
Unsurprisingly, these trends contribute greatly to famine locally and to the
steady rise of grain prices globally.37 Local food shortages are simply a
prelude for the emerging global food shortage. Rises in the price of grains
and rice are now understood to be trend driven. According to Brown, food
shortage in the top twenty failing states is likely to overturn the proverbial
applecart, creating chaos, terrorism, piracy, increased problems with drugs
and weapons, and refugees.38 The most severe convergence of local and
global drivers of famine has yet to occur. However, according to the World
Bank, 175 million South Asians subsist on grain produced from water
sources that will soon be exhausted.39 And, China’s grain and rice crops
also show diminishing yields as more aquifers run dry each year.40
C. Provisional Conclusion
Developed nations may initially benefit from rising temperatures due to
climate change. But they will succumb to the same dangers facing
developing nations as temperatures continue to rise.41 In the meantime,
developing nations will suffer certain severe economic loss, and may suffer
the bitter fruits of failed states, disease, political extremism, and violence, if
nothing is done.

II. SHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
There is an emerging scientific consensus regarding the existence and
dangers of climate change.42 Unfortunately, it has not settled the policy
debate about what should be done, when, and by whom.43 Many nations in
the international community claim that the United States’ willingness to
stonewall on a range of policy issues has undermined the otherwise
international effort.44 However, the failure to shape an effective
international consensus is not entirely due to a lack of political will and
statecraft in the United States.45 Achieving global consensus on an effective
global strategy is a titanic undertaking. The policy issues that the United
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States typically raises are highly relevant. But the United States has
generally been inflexible and unwilling to negotiate.46 Historically, U.S.
involvement in the international effort to stabilize climate change has been
wholly symbolic.
Policies are shaped largely according to data. The quality of a policy is
intrinsically linked to the quality of information upon which that policy is
based. Climate change science poses a number of challenges due to the
complexity of the problem.47 Further, due to the array of influential
interested parties, gathering data that are free from bias is a constant
concern.48 The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was founded
by the United Nations in 1988 to provide policymakers with objective,
relevant, and up-to-date scientific data on climate change.49 The IPCC
gathers the most relevant, peer-reviewed, scientific, social, and economic
literature available and synthesizes the data in comprehensive reports.50 In
1990, the IPCC released its first report, which was instrumental in the
establishment of the UNFCCC.51
The UNFCCC is a “framework” treaty that is intended to be augmented
and amended over time as better information becomes available.52 Its
significance was largely symbolic because it set no mandatory limits for the
reduction of GHGs. However, it did provide periodic updates (called
“protocols”) that set mandatory emissions caps.53 Following the release of
the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report in 1995, the UNFCCC member
nations began work on the first of its protocols: the Kyoto Protocol.
Adopted by the UNFCCC in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol set mandatory
limits on the production of six GHGs.54 The United States signed the Kyoto
Protocol, but never ratified it. In fact, the Kyoto Protocol was never sent to
the Senate for ratification.55 Anticipating a vote on the protocol, the Senate
unanimously passed Senate Resolution 98, which resolved that the United
States should not be a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol or any thereafter,
which would “either mandate emissions reductions from developed nations
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without similar commitments from developing nations, or would result in
serious harm to the economy of the U.S.”56
In 1998, the Clinton administration commissioned an analysis of the costs
and benefits of complying with the Kyoto Protocol, which determined that
the benefits far outweighed the costs.57 Later that year, the House
Committee on Science commissioned a second cost-benefit analysis from
the U.S. Department of Energy based on its National Energy Modeling
System (the “NEMS 1998 Report”).58 That analysis found that compliance
with the Kyoto Protocol had the potential to cause serious harm to the U.S.
economy.59 The controversy between the two cost-benefit analyses was
never settled, however, because U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol
was rejected on other grounds. That is, since developing nations are not
required to reduce their GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol,
ratification by the 1998 Senate was impossible because of Senate
Resolution 98. The vast majority of UNFCCC participants—183 of the 192
member nations—ratified Kyoto.60 The United States was not among them.
Nevertheless, the United States is still a member nation of the UNFCCC
and participates in the UNFCCC’s annual Conferences of the Parties (COP).
The COP is the supreme policymaking body of the UNFCCC.61 In 2005, the
UNFCCC began to negotiate policy for the second Kyoto commitment
period in Montreal. In 2007, the COP met in Bali, where U.S. negotiators
rejected proposals by other member nations to set mandatory emissions
reduction targets at the outset of the negotiations.62 But the United States
ultimately agreed to adoption by consensus for a framework for future
negotiations wherein mandatory targets would be set for industrialized
nations.63 Copenhagen was intended to produce those mandatory targets.
On March 25, 2009, the Obama administration began a series of forums
with fifteen of the world’s wealthiest nations, ostensibly to create a “candid
dialogue” between developed and developing nations to “advance the
exploration of concrete initiatives and joint ventures that increase the supply
of clean energy while cutting greenhouse gas emissions.”64 As the
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Copenhagen UNFCCC negotiations approached, the United States appeared
to be a willing participant at the bargaining table. But the policy concerns
that prevented ratification in 1998 persisted. The United States’ willingness
to participate in the second Kyoto commitment period depended on whether
the covenants therein were “environmentally effective” and “economically
sustainable.”65 According to U.S. negotiators, environmental effectiveness
requires that all the world’s largest emitters (including developing nations,
like China) make firm commitments to reduce emissions.66 Further, the
UNFCCC must develop and bring to the market clean-energy technologies
at a cost that nations can justify to their citizens.67 As we approach
negotiations in Mexico, we face the same obstacles.

III. JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS OF COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED
RESPONSIBILITIES
The parties to the UNFCCC treaty are divided into three groups: (1)
Annex I parties, (2) Annex II parties, and (3) Non-Annex I parties.68 Annex
I parties are industrialized nations that were members of the Organisation
for Economic Co-ordination and Development (OECD) in 1992, and
nations with Economies in Transition (EIT). Annex II nations are the same
as Annex I nations excluding the EIT nations—that is, Annex II nations are
the wealthiest and most stable of the Annex I nations. Finally, Non-Annex I
nations are the developing member nations of the UNFCCC.69
The obstacles to international consensus are economic,70 technological,71
diplomatic,72 historical,73 and natural.74 While it is beyond the scope of this
article to address all obstacles, international policymakers who lose sight of
the big picture do so at their own peril. It may be impossible to attain
optimal balance of all the competing policies. But, policymakers should not
be too eager to sacrifice one policy for another.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I nations make mandatory
commitments, but Non-Annex I nations participate on a strictly voluntary
basis.75 This policy is based on a principle called “common but
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differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR), which is a novel principle in
international law that is peculiar to environmental treaties.76 This principle
of differentiated responsibilities appears structurally unfair because duties
do not flow to all parties. This imbalance is aggravated by the fact that
certain developing nations, like China and India, are also among the largest
emitters.77 This policy was intended to build consensus by making it easier
for developing nations to ratify the treaty, but it proved to be a policy
mistake.78 First, the United States refused to ratify Kyoto based, nominally,
on this policy.79 Second, considering the speed at which developing nations
are industrializing, this policy was simply not environmentally effective.80
However, as a practical issue and as a matter of simple justice, developing
nations are unable to undertake the same kind of commitments that
developed nations assume under Kyoto.81 Therefore, some incarnation of
CBDR must be preserved.
A. Normative Implications
Internationally, there is a growing consciousness of the biological,
economic, and human costs of inaction.82 But even as the fog of ignorance
clears, academic mediocrity and ideology threaten to perpetuate inertial
human thought and behavior. Principal among the phalanx of mediocrity is
the positivistic ideology that rejects the international environmental policy
of CBDR.83
Facially, an agreement wherein duties do not flow proportionately to all
parties seems unfair. However, when viewed in context, the principle of
CBDR prevents far more unfairness than it causes. That is, it would be
fundamentally unfair to hobble the economic development of poorer nations
by imposing environmental mandates that did not exist when Annex I
nations developed their own economies. And it is fundamentally unfair to
fill the atmosphere with our wastes and then cry foul when Non-Annex I
nations begin to industrialize.
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Furthermore, when placed in the proper context, it is clear that there are
other moral considerations that far outweigh the superficial issue of facial
fairness. The de facto suppression of Non-Annex I economies is
unjustifiable where people are suffering from malnutrition, disease, and
illiteracy at rates that are morally unacceptable. Describing all of the
possible normative considerations that support the application of the
principle of CBDR is beyond the scope of this article. Articles of high
quality concerning this subject already exist. One of the earliest and most
influential articles following the establishment of the UNFCCC was written
by Henry Shue. Shue’s article, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury
Emissions, provides an analytical context for environmental policymaking
at the international level, which rejects “[a]ny strategy of maintaining
affluence for some people by keeping other people at or below subsistence”
as “patently unfair . . . extraordinarily unequal—intolerably unequal.”84
B. Corrective Justice Implications
Corrective justice is also implicated by the principle of CBDR.85 The
argument is that, since Annex I nations are responsible for most of the
existing stock of anthropogenic carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, they are
morally responsible for correcting the problem.86 Further, since climate
change is likely to cause disproportionate injury to developing (Non-Annex
I) nations, the responsible Annex I nations should compensate developing
nations for damages.87 Initially, corrective justice is an attractive rationale
for applying the principle of differentiated responsibilities. One could argue
that the responsibilities of Annex I and Non-Annex I nations under an
international agreement should reflect the damages that are owed to
developing nations by Annex I nations.
However, corrective justice arguments are difficult to sustain in the
context of international relations. As Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein points
out in Climate Change Justice, the weakness of the corrective justice
argument in international relations is due to four considerations, which
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essentially parallel the basic tort inquiry.88 First, corrective justice assumes
a culpable agent or entity. Annex I nations are the culpable agents in the
calculation of corrective justice. But most of the GHGs in the atmosphere
were emitted by Annex I citizens who are now dead. So, if the costs of
remedying climate-change injuries are shifted to Annex I nations, most of
the payers will be paying damages that are disproportionately high in
comparison to their actual emissions. Further, the damages paid would be
drawn under a tax structure that does not account for individual GHG
emissions. So, again, citizens who have emitted little will pay the same as
those who have emitted a lot. Posner and Sunstein refer to this as “the
wrongdoer identity problem.”89
Second, corrective justice assumes an injured victim or entity. Although
Non-Annex I nations will be the early victims of climate change, most of
the victims live in the future. Further, the injuries might only be suffered by
a small proportion of Non-Annex I citizens whereas the damages would be
distributed equally among all citizens (if at all). Posner and Sunstein refer to
this as “the victim/claimant identity problem.”90
Third, corrective justice assumes that the culpable agent’s wrongdoing
actually caused the injuries sustained by the victim. If a citizen of a NonAnnex I nation dies from malaria, there may be a direct link between the
malaria and global warming arising from GHG emissions. But proving that
such a link exists with any degree of accuracy would be impossible. So, in
the context of climate change, causation might pose an evidence problem
that would effectively preclude correction. Posner and Sunstein refer to this
as “the causation problem.”91
Finally, corrective justice assumes a culpable state of mind—
negligence.92 Under the present paradigms of negligence, only those
emissions that occurred after the achievement of scientific consensus would
be negligent.93 That is, the emitters of GHGs cannot be held negligent for
emissions that occurred before the dangers of climate change were known.
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Thus, the vast majority of injurious emissions are not actionable. Posner and
Sunstein refer to this as “the culpability problem.”94
For those of us who are inclined to take responsibility for the damages
caused by our nation’s industrialization, Posner and Sunstein’s arguments
ring hollow. Whatever weaknesses may exist in corrective justice rationales
for CBDR under our common-law tort analysis, it cannot be denied that we
have reaped the lion’s share of the benefits from our nation’s GHG-emitting
activities, and we should therefore internalize the costs. Furthermore, it is
self-serving, even pedantic, to avoid responsibility by mechanistically
applying our own common-law analysis, which, not incidentally, did not
contemplate nations as tortfeasors.
Writing in a similar vein, Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith attempt to cast
international cooperation as purely a function of self-interest through the
application of “game theory.”95 Their scholarship advances the idea that
neither custom nor treaty can overcome a nation’s self-interest under the
right circumstances.96 This descriptive analysis of actual international
positivism is sobering, but there is no reason to advance positivism
prescriptively. That is, it is irrational to aspire to the way things have been,
instead of aspiring to the way things should be. As law professor Mark
Chinen opines, “a descriptive critique is inapposite because rules of law are
used primarily to evaluate behavior, not describe it.”97 Implicit in
scholarship of positivism is the idea that any action that is not taken purely
for reasons of self-interest is foolish and naive. However, Chinen cautions
that the legitimacy of that evaluation is called into question “if there is a
broad mismatch between how states actually behave and how their behavior
is evaluated.”98 Another lesson from Copenhagen is that there may be a
broad mismatch between the aspirations of corrective justice and the actual
behavior of the UNFCCC nation states. So, it is unfortunate that corrective
justice is the sole moral rationale that is usually alluded to in the public
debate.99
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C. Distributive Justice Implications
Distributive justice arguments do not rely on blame. Rather, distributive
justice recognizes gaping social inequities and prescribes more equitable
distributions of wealth simply as a matter of course.100 Neoclassical and
neoliberal economists are likely to reject this argument on principle as
patently socialist. However, if you are inclined to accept the theory that
achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth internationally is
desirable, then the principle of CBDR would be desirable as well.
But, as Posner and Sunstein point out, if you are inclined to accept the
righteousness of distributive justice, the differentiation of responsibilities
under international treaty might not be the most practical means by which to
achieve optimal distribution.101 Cash payments would get money to poorer
nations faster and allow those nations to use the funds in the ways that they
deem fit. Cash payments would also avoid the collateral consequences of
hurting poor people in rich nations (who are likely to bear much of the costs
of low emissions caps in their household energy costs) and benefitting
wealthy people in poor nations (who are likely to be the emitters).102
For those of us who are so inclined, the distributive justice rationale for
differentiating responsibilities is valid. But it might not be the most
effective means to the end of equitable wealth distribution.
D. Provisional Conclusion
Justice-based moral arguments for CBDR are powerful and compelling.
But, if considerations of justice do not suffice as a basis for applying the
principle of CBDR, certain practical considerations are undeniable. The
“polluter pays” principle need not be based in fault, but in pragmatism. As
Henry Shue advocates, “the polluter should pay because this assignment of
clean-up burdens creates the strongest disincentive to pollute.”103 Further,
were the Kyoto Protocol to abandon the practice of CBDR, most of the
Non-Annex I nations would simply be unable to comply.104 Effectively this
would alienate most or all of the developing nations from the Kyoto

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

Capping Deforestation Emissions in Developing Countries 833

Protocol and would be catastrophic to the international effort. Developing
nations hold the vast majority of the earth’s people and environmental
resources. The fact that they are developing means that vast numbers of
human beings are beginning to consume energy, goods, and the natural
resources that are abundantly available to them (like coal and wood) at rates
that are likely to grow rapidly during the second Kyoto commitment
period.105
These human activities will absolutely create GHGs and will significantly
intensify climate change.106 The question is, by how much? Alienation of
the Non-Annex I nations at this stage will undoubtedly frustrate future
attempts to curb emissions in those nations. So, the participation of
developing nations in international efforts to stabilize GHG emissions is
absolutely essential.107 CBDR may appear to strain the generosity of
wealthy nations, but, in the final analysis, it may be a necessary concession
to protect our self-interest.
But, while CBDR is intended to address competing policy issues, it is not
clear whether it is practical to stabilize GHG emissions while
simultaneously protecting the growth of new economies. The problem with
global warming is that it is a global problem: one that will require a
consensus-based, international legal process in spite of the fact that different
member nations will necessarily have different interests in reducing
emissions. For the reasons outlined above, it is clear that, ethically and
pragmatically, Annex I nations should bear the greatest share of the
responsibilities. But, developing nations might also have to take significant
action if the international response is to be effective.108
The following section describes the current avenues afforded to
developing nations for participation in Kyoto’s emissions-reduction
programs. As explained, these avenues are woefully insufficient to achieve
the goal of environmental effectiveness.
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IV. CURRENT AVENUES FOR DEVELOPING NATION PARTICIPATION
Developing countries will continue to industrialize. Inevitably, emissions
will increase. Developed countries will continue to consume energy, goods,
and services, which will increase emissions as well. These emissions will
add to the existing stock of GHG in the atmosphere.109 So, U.S. negotiators’
concern that a complete lack of mandatory commitments on the part of
Non-Annex I nations could undermine the environmental effectiveness of
the Kyoto Protocol is not without a rational basis.110
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing nations are limited to three
avenues of participation—all of which are voluntary. First, developing
nations may initiate their own national GHG mitigation projects. Second,
developing nations may assist Annex I nations through the Clean
Development Mechanism. Finally, developing nations may adopt legally
binding emissions-limitation targets.111
A. National Mitigation Projects
National mitigation projects are encouraged by UNFCCC Article 4(1)(b)
which requires: “All Parties, taking into account their common but
differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional
development priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall . . . [f]ormulate .
. . national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing
measures to mitigate climate change.”112 The Kyoto Protocol Article 10(a)
reaffirms the requirements of the UNFCCC.113 But the Kyoto Protocol adds
“in order to achieve sustainable development”114 and Article 10(b)(i)
specifies the sectors of the economy that are implicated by the rule:
“energy, transport, and industry sectors as well as agriculture, forestry, and
waste management.”115
Since 1994, several developing nations have successfully implemented
national GHG mitigation programs, beginning with Costa Rica.116 But such
national programs are voluntary; thus, the programs are not legally
enforceable. Further, the nature and extent of mitigation programs in
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developing nations depends on the funding received from developed
nations.117 As a result, national mitigation programs in developing countries
are rare, heterogeneous, and small in scope.118
B. The Clean Development Mechanism
The Kyoto Protocol mandates that the Annex I nations reduce their
aggregate GHG emissions to 5 percent below 1990 levels.119 In the main,
developed nations meet their targets through national measures. But the
Kyoto Protocol utilizes several market mechanisms to allow member
nations to help each other meet their respective goals: (1) the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), (2) Joint Implementation (JI), and (3)
emissions trading.120 The CDM allows developing nations to assist Annex I
nations in reaching their emissions targets while simultaneously promoting
sustainable development in Non-Annex I nations.121
Codified under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM is a rather
ingenious economic mechanism. As developed nations progress toward
their target goals, the measures that they must take are likely to become
increasingly expensive. At a certain point, the expense may cease to be costeffective. For example, suppose that an Annex I nation has to limit its
emissions to five thousand metric tons of carbon dioxide. But the nation has
projected that it will emit ten thousand metric tons. The nation begins to
pass regulations for its industrial emitters and, at a cost of $8 million, the
emitters reduce the nation’s projections to six million tons. But, to cut the
remaining one thousand tons of carbon dioxide, the industries will have to
spend $800 million. In the event that an Annex I nation finds that it will be
cost prohibitive to meet its emissions target, it can fulfill its obligation by
reducing emissions in a developing nation.122 So, the hypothetical nation
could conduct a $2 million technology transfer to a developing nation that
would reduce that nation’s emissions by one thousand tons. In this way the
Annex I nations can meet their targets efficiently, and developing nations
can benefit from the project.
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The CDM requires an extensive certification process to ensure that the
emissions reductions are “additional to any that would occur in the absence
of the certified project activity.”123 For this reason CDM projects are easier
to evaluate than national mitigation projects. Developing nations participate
in CDM projects on a strictly voluntary basis.124 But participation requires
only that the developing nation accept the benefit of the CDM project. So,
the CDM requires much less commitment from the developing nation than
national mitigation projects. Further, CDM projects exist only when Annex
I nations encounter difficulty meeting their targets. Consequently, the
amount and scope of potential CDM projects was dramatically reduced
when the United States backed out of Kyoto.125 Regardless, the CDM
projects are usually small and lack the capacity to address the scope of the
problem.126
C. Binding Targets Through a Status Change
For a developing nation to undertake binding emissions targets it must
successfully change its status from Non-Annex I to Annex I under both the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.127 The transitioning party is required to
petition the COP six months prior to the following COP. At the COP, the
status can be changed by a consensus or a three-fourths majority vote by the
member nations.128
To date, no Non-Annex I nation has successfully transitioned to Annex I
status. Developing nations that resist being pressured into joining Annex I
have precluded the amendment of the treaties for the nations that seek to
transition.129 But, even if a developing nation were able to make the desired
transition, it is unlikely that it would be able to adopt a Kyoto-style
emissions cap.130 Under Kyoto, Annex I nations set their emissions caps
according to emissions levels from a previous year. But developing nations
are growing so rapidly that to cap their progress in this way would
unreasonably burden their growth. Also, a would-be transitioning nation is
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not likely to have the institutional, financial, or technical capacities to
monitor and enforce an emissions cap.131
D. Provisional Conclusion
To review, there are three avenues available for Non-Annex I parties to
participate in GHG mitigation under Kyoto: national mitigation programs,
the CDM, and taking on binding targets. National mitigation programs are
unenforceable, heterogeneous, and difficult to assess. Consequently, the
environmental effectiveness of such programs is likely to vary widely. The
CDM is an innovative means by which to encourage sustainable
development in developing nations and assist developed nations in meeting
their targets efficiently. Unfortunately, CDM projects are small and
inadequately incentivized. Binding targets require a long and difficult
amendment process, which, to date, has wholly precluded developing
nations from undertaking binding targets.132
As we approach negotiations in Mexico, we must evaluate these avenues
candidly. The CDM and the national mitigation projects should be
preserved because they do not create a disincentive. However, the
difficulties of transitioning from Non-Annex I to Annex I status are
counterproductive and should be reformed. Ultimately, these avenues
simply are not sufficient to address the magnitude of the global warming
problem. Additional avenues must be opened. The following section
describes and analyzes the proposed avenue of REDD, which, as explained
below, has tremendous potential to reduce GHG emissions from developing
countries if implemented correctly.

V. A NEW AVENUE FOR DEVELOPING NATION PARTICIPATION:
REDD
The UNFCC program REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation) includes an initiative to introduce forestry and land
use into the Kyoto emissions-trading mechanism.133 Emissions trading is a
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market-based scheme designed to transfer the burden of reducing emissions
to the most efficient actors. Emissions trading can only occur in a market
where emissions have been limited in some way; so, under Kyoto, it is
currently only available to the Annex I nations that have undertaken binding
emissions targets.
Suppose that a private emitter in Japan (emitter J) discovers that, due to
increased production, it will definitely exceed the emissions permitted to it
under the Kyoto cap. In order to avoid exceeding its allotted units, emitter J
can either cut production or invest in novel and expensive proprietary
technology. Now suppose that there is an emitter in Germany (emitter G),
which will fall well below its permitted emissions due to technological
improvements. Under the emissions trading mechanism, emitter J can pay
emitter G in exchange for the rights to emitter G’s unused emissions. As
long as the cost of purchasing the rights from emitter G is less than the costs
of forgoing production or purchasing the new technology, emitter J would
be wise to make a deal with emitter G. Through emissions trading, the
economic costs of an emissions cap are minimized, but the efficient actor is
financially rewarded and the inefficient actor is financially punished.
Emissions trading is an attractive solution because it mitigates the
economic costs of reducing emissions. But, both policy goals of
environmental effectiveness and environmental justice may be undermined
by the particular design features of a given emissions-trading scheme. For
example, if the annual cap on emissions is set too high, then emitters will
not have the economic incentive to reduce their emissions. Or, if the
emissions cap is set too low, particularly for developing nations, then
economic growth can be stifled right where it is needed most.
REDD will utilize the emissions-trading mechanism to stabilize the
GHGs that result from deforestation. According to the Stern Review,
deforestation currently accounts for 18 percent of the carbon dioxide
released annually into the atmosphere.134 This is because forest soils and
vegetation contain half of the earth’s terrestrial carbon pool.135 The
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remaining carbon is contained in other life forms, fossil fuels, and the
oceans. In the global carbon cycle, carbon is exchanged between terrestrial
ecosystems (forests, for example), and the atmosphere through the
processes of photosynthesis, respiration, decomposition, and land-use
changes.136
When forests are leveled, they (1) cease to absorb carbon dioxide out of
the atmosphere, (2) release large quantities of carbon dioxide from the soil,
and (3) release substantial quantities of carbon dioxide from the vegetation
if it is burned or allowed to decompose.137
Many of the poorest Non-Annex I nations contain the earth’s great
tropical forests and REDD is targeted, almost exclusively, at the
deforestation taking place in these rapidly industrializing nations. Tropical
forests are particularly important to the earth’s carbon cycles because of
their photosynthetic capabilities. In fact, tropical forests have been
analogized to a septic tank for the atmosphere because of the quantities of
carbon dioxide they absorb.138 According to the IPCC, tropical forests
absorb and contain more carbon than the temperate and boreal forests
combined.139 But, for a number of reasons,140 deforestation in the tropics
occurs at an alarming rate of one acre per second.141 As a result, the
permanent conversion of forested to non-forested land in developing
countries is one of the major causes of the accumulation of GHGs in the
atmosphere.142 Additionally, as more tropical forests are leveled, the earth
becomes less capable of absorbing GHGs. So, REDD will both prevent
dangerous emissions and preserve vital environmental services.
The drivers of deforestation are largely due to subsistence activity,
which, if capriciously halted, could cause tremendous human hardship. The
UNFCCC studies of the drivers of deforestation in developing countries
identify both proximate causes (such as logging, infrastructure
development, and agriculture),143 and underlying causes (such as public
policy, institutional weakness, and corruption, as well as weak land tenure
and property rights).144
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Poverty and scarce income opportunities can force landless people to the
forested frontier to clear marginal land for subsistence crops.145 In fact,
according to the UNFCCC, the single greatest driver of deforestation in
developing countries is the clearing of land for agriculture.146 Land that is
appropriate for agriculture is scarce in the tropics. The forested frontier
provides displaced or unemployed people with land upon which to plant a
crop or pasture a small herd.147 So, it should be emphasized that avoiding
deforestation in the tropics literally means preventing human subsistence
activities in developing nations.
The UNFCCC has outlined a number of policy approaches to address the
problem of deforestation in developing countries. Some are preventative,
such as the effort to reduce prices and demand for forest-related products.148
Others are punitive, such as the effort to increase the costs and risks of
deforestation.149 Still other approaches, like the effort to improve land
tenure rights, address the underlying policy and institutional causes of
deforestation.150
So, REDD emissions trading is only one of many incentives aimed at
slowing deforestation in developing countries. But of all the initiatives, it is
the only one that will require developing nations to undertake binding
commitments under an international treaty. Unfortunately, the existing
Kyoto Protocol did not contemplate binding commitments from Non-Annex
I nations. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol authorizes the COP to “define
the relevant principles, modalities, rules, and guidelines, in particular for
verification, reporting, and accountability for emissions trading.”151 This
gives the COP broad discretion to shape the emissions-trading market. But
the existing market design is not suited for Non-Annex I nations and
avoided deforestation. Under Kyoto, developed nations undertake binding
reductions of their industrial emissions under Article 3. Developed nations
are only permitted to engage in emissions trading “for the purposes of
fulfilling their commitments under Article 3” and only as a supplement to
domestic emissions-reduction programs.
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REDD will differ from conventional emissions trading because it will not
require Non-Annex I nations to limit their industrial GHG emissions in any
way. Furthermore, the existing emissions-capping scheme, codified under
Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, was designed under different assumptions
and is unsuited to cap deforestation emissions. The following describes
conventional emissions trading and explains why REDD will require a
creative new capping scheme if it is to be both environmentally effective
and environmentally just.
A. The Baseline Model: Capping Emissions Under Article 3
The capping method adopted by the COP for the first Kyoto Protocol is
best described as a “baseline” model. Under the baseline model, Annex I
nations take on a binding emissions target based on emissions levels from a
previous year. The emissions level of the year chosen is the baseline. For
the wealthiest member nations, the baseline year is 1990 and the target is 5
percent below 1990 levels. For the EIT member nations, the baseline year
and emissions target vary because many EIT nations’ economies were
relatively small in 1990.152
The targets are measured in tons of carbon emissions. Each ton of carbon
under a baseline cap is equal to one “assigned amount unit” (AAU), which
the emitter is permitted to emit or sell to another emitter.153 So if Nation
“Q” emitted thirty thousand tons of carbon into the atmosphere in 1990, it is
permitted to emit thirty thousand tons of carbon during each year of the
Kyoto commitment period. If Nation Q emits less carbon than it is allotted,
say ten thousand tons less, then it can sell all ten thousand tons to Annex I
nations that failed to meet their baseline targets.
Additionally, there are three methods under Kyoto by which an Annex I
nation can earn emissions rights over and above their baseline AAUs. First,
Annex I nations that participate in the CDM154 will earn additional
emissions rights for every ton of carbon emissions avoided in Non-Annex I
nations by a CDM project. The units generated through the CDM are called
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“certified emission reduction units” (CERs).155 So, if Nation Q were to
build a wind farm in a Non-Annex I nation, like China, which produced
power that would otherwise have come from coal, thereby avoiding ten
thousand tons of carbon emissions, then Nation Q would acquire the rights
to emit ten thousand tons of carbon or sell ten thousand CERs.
Second, any Annex I nation that participates in Joint Implementation (JI)
projects wherein it reduces the emissions of other Annex I nations will earn
additional emissions rights for every ton of carbon dioxide avoided. Units
generated through JI are called “emission reduction units” (ERUs).156 So, if
Nation Q builds a solar power plant in an Annex I nation, like Italy, thereby
avoiding ten thousand tons of carbon emissions, then Nation Q acquires the
right to sell ten thousand ERUs or emit ten thousand tons of carbon.
Third, Annex I nations that participate in land use changes leading to the
absorption of carbon dioxide through the carbon cycle, such as
reforestation, earn additional rights for every metric ton of carbon that will
be absorbed annually by the planted forest through photosynthesis and
respiration. Units generated through land use and forestry projects are called
“removal units” (RMUs). So, if Nation Q plants enough trees to annually
remove ten thousand tons of carbon from the atmosphere, then Nation Q
will have earned the right to emit ten thousand tons of carbon or to sell ten
thousand ERUs.
To implement REDD under the baseline approach, developing nations
would have to limit their deforestation emissions according to emissions
from a previous year. For convenience, I will call the allotment of emissions
rights under the baseline “REDD Units” (“RDUs”) and each RDU will be
equal to one metric ton of carbon dioxide. So, if a Non-Annex I nation does
not use all of its RDUs, it is free to sell its unused units either to (1) other
Non-Annex I nations that failed to meet their REDD emissions targets, or
(2) Annex I nations that failed to meet their industrial emissions targets.
There are several features of the baseline approach that make it
unsuitable for REDD. First and foremost, it did not contemplate the erratic
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rates of deforestation that occur in developing countries. A baseline works
well for industrial emissions which tend to grow at relatively predictable
rates.157 Rates of tropical deforestation, on the other hand, tend to ebb and
flow according to a complex set of factors.158 For example, the Brazilian
Amazon lost twenty thousand square kilometers of tropical rainforests in
1988, eleven thousand square kilometers in 1991, twenty-nine thousand
square kilometers in 1995, and eighteen thousand and one hundred square
kilometers in 1996.159 So, if the deforestation baseline for Brazil was
arbitrarily set at 1995 levels of deforestation, the cap may be set too high to
be environmentally effective. That is, Brazil might have such a glut of
RDUs that it would have no incentive to slow deforestation during the
commitment period. If the deforestation baseline was set at 1988 levels, the
cap may be too low to be environmentally just. That is, Brazil might have
too few RDUs to allow for human sustenance activities, thereby creating
unacceptable human hardship among vulnerable communities.
Second, the Kyoto Protocol requires nations that participate in emissions
trading to develop monitoring procedures which may be cost prohibitive if
there is no early money available from the emissions market to pay for it.
That is, developing nations will have to organize (1) a national system to
estimate anthropogenic deforestation emissions to set the target, (2) a
governmental body to monitor and facilitate emissions-trading transactions,
(3) a national program to educate deforestation-emitters about the program,
and (4) a system to preserve and protect a certain amount of forest, before
making any REDD money. The baseline approach assumes that a
participating nation has the wherewithal to front-load this kind of national
endeavor. If Brazil is unsure of the kind of returns it will receive from the
emissions market, it may forgo participation in the emissions market.
Third, it is unlikely that the baseline approach will replace the income
provided by deforestation. The value of an emissions-trading unit is set by
the market and will be negotiated between the private sellers and buyers.
RDUs will be adding to the other units available on the market, which will
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lower demand and dilute the value of the trading units. This problem can be
remedied if Annex I nations agree to undertake radically lower emissions
caps, but the COP has not yet negotiated the modalities for accounting for
AAUs.160
The final problem with the baseline approach involves valuation. Under
conventional emissions trading, the value of the RDU would be exactly
equal to the value of the AAU, because both units represent the right to emit
one ton of carbon. The first reason this is a problem is because the monetary
valuation of the emissions-trading units does not distinguish between the
sustenance activity forgone by avoiding deforestation in developing nations
and the economic activity forgone by avoiding industrial emissions in
developed countries. As a matter of simple equity, it is unjust to ignore the
fact that the participation of developing nations comes at much greater costs
to their human health and prosperity. The emissions market will fail if it
does not reflect the gaping social inequities between the developed and the
developing world.
Furthermore, the equivalence of emissions-trading units in the
conventional emissions market fails to account for the abundant
environmental services that are preserved by avoiding deforestation, such as
biological diversity, water cycle regulation, and soil conservation.
Biological diversity alone provides humankind with essential medical
research, maintains the resilience of ecosystems to cope with inevitable
climate change, and provides potential adaptation measures for reducing
climate-related losses to agriculture.
However, the most troubling problem of equating RDU values to AAU
values is that it fails to account for the environmental service of removing
GHGs from the atmosphere through respiration and photosynthesis.
Standing forests in the tropics continue to absorb carbon dioxide, so long as
they are standing. Millions of square kilometers of tropical forests in
developing countries are absorbing carbon emissions without compensation.
This is a public good that goes unrewarded. The value of RDUs must
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compensate this public good if the carbon market is to be environmentally
effective.
A just, practical, and effective emissions market will reflect both the
gaping social inequities between Annex I and Non-Annex I nations, and the
tremendous global public goods that accompany the preservation of tropical
forests. But conventional emissions trading can do neither effectively.
Thankfully, the emissions market can be made to reflect our shared values.
The following describes a popular effort to design a more practical and just
REDD mechanism: the “carbon stock” design. However, this design fails to
address all of the shortcomings of conventional emissions trading.
Furthermore, the carbon stock design does not promise to be
environmentally effective.
B. The Carbon Stock Model
The carbon stock model is advocated by the Center for International
Sustainable Development Law.161 Under this model, developing nations are
permitted to emit all of the carbon dioxide stored in their forests and soils.
The cap is limited only to the amount of carbon stored terrestrially within
the nation’s boundaries. This allows forest landowners to collect on every
acre of preserved forest.162
The carbon stock model has several advantages over the baseline
approach. First, it would mobilize faster investment and capital flows.163
Rather than post facto, developing nations could begin selling credits
immediately based on lands that have been set aside for protection. Second,
the carbon stock method avoids the problem of setting a baseline according
to a prior year. This would prevent setting arbitrary caps that may be too
high to be environmentally effective or too low to be environmentally just.
Finally, by setting a cap based on the entire available stock of forest, the
carbon stock method is more permissive of the human subsistence activity
that often drives deforestation in developing countries.
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So, the carbon stock model would solve the practical problem of
providing early investment for national emissions monitoring and it would
better reflect the social inequities between Annex I and Non-Annex I
nations. However, it accomplishes these goals at great cost to environmental
effectiveness. The carbon stock model would flood the emissions market
with millions of fungible RDUs and inevitably dilute the value of all
emissions units. Further, it would allow developing countries to participate
in the emissions market without undertaking meaningful, binding emissions
targets. These features would combine to severely dilute the economic
incentives of avoiding both deforestation and industrial emissions. That is, a
developing nation could do nothing to slow deforestation and sell the
remaining deforestation AAUs for a net gain. And a developed nation could
continue industrial business as usual because of the availability of
inexpensive emissions units in a glutted, buyer’s market.
The baseline model is aligned with the Kyoto Protocol’s modality for
determining AAUs for emissions trading. But the baseline method is not
aligned with the principle of CBDR. The carbon stock model is more
aligned with the principle of CBDR, but it is unlikely to slow the rate of
deforestation in the tropics. The competing policy concerns of
environmental effectiveness and environmental justice are poorly served by
either model. But a just, practical, and effective emissions market can be
had. The following section describes my proposal for an emissions market
intended to address the shortcomings of conventional emissions trading,
without sacrificing environmental effectiveness.

VI. PROPOSALS
This article was written with the assumption that pragmatism, not
orthodoxy, will lead to the best solutions. Plato liked to tell the story of
Thales, who was so enamored by the stars that he stumbled into a well.164
Similarly, pure-of-heart ideologues will not solve this problem. Staring into
the fixed stars of their ideals, they will fail to see what is at their very feet.
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Nevertheless, as a practical matter, ideology must not be ignored and the
failure in Copenhagen also reflects our collective naivety. As the editorial
posited, the transition to a low-carbon economy “will require a feat of
engineering and innovation to match anything in our history. But whereas
putting a man on the moon or splitting the atom were born of conflict and
competition, the coming carbon race must be driven by a collaborative
effort to achieve collective salvation.”165 After the failure of Copenhagen,
the insight of this mandate is more acute. That is, the transition to a lowcarbon economy will require degrees of both credulity and skepticism. It is
now clear that we must be skeptical enough to harness the forces of selfinterest, but credulous enough to devote them, not only to our own
prosperity, but also to that of human beings who live in other regions of the
world, and who have not yet been born.
Conventional emissions trading fails to provide developing nations with
the capital needed to build the institutions to monitor their emissions trading
and deforestation activities. Conventional emissions trading also fails to
account for the tremendous amount of carbon that standing tropical forests
annually remove from the atmosphere. The practical problem of raising
early capital could easily be addressed if Annex I nations simply made cash
payments to Non-Annex I nations in exchange for this quantifiable
environmental service. Voluntary contributions to support REDD have
already begun, and most REDD advocates hope voluntary contributions will
suffice as the primary finance mechanism.166 According to the Meridian
Institute, a phased approach to mobilizing international finance is required.
But the distributive and corrective rationales for voluntary finance make it
vulnerable.167
I propose that developed nations begin to compensate developing nations
for the environmental services that their forests provide. Early money to
support REDD could barely begin to account for these services.
Second, Non-Annex I nations will have to cap their emissions in a way
that is less arbitrary than the baseline method. The carbon stock method
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would eliminate binding emissions targets altogether, thereby throwing the
baby out with the bathwater. In 2006, Kevin Baumert proposed a sensible
capping method for industrial emissions coming from developing countries.
Baumert’s method utilizes what he called “action targets,”168 which are
equally applicable to capping deforestation emissions.
Action targets are not hard targets. Instead of relying on a baseline that
may be too high or low, a developing nation would have to show that it took
measures to prevent a certain number of emissions based on the amount of
emissions emitted.169 The “target” is not a specific number of tons of
emissions based on the emissions of a previous year; it is the ratio of
emissions forgone to emissions emitted. This method requires that the
nation take progressively more environmentally effective measures to
reduce emissions and focus on emissions-reduction activities rather than a
fixed emissions level. Capping emissions in this way effectively
incentivizes avoiding deforestation without subjecting developing nations to
the same kind of targets that developed nations undertake. This kind of cap
is both environmentally effective and environmentally just because it
requires Non-Annex I nations to undertake binding emissions-reduction
commitments with a sober understanding of the greater costs to human
health and prosperity that it entails.
Finally, the emissions market should not blindly equate industrial AAUs
with deforestation RDUs. Instead, the market should reflect the fact that
RDUs not only prevent the release of carbon into the atmosphere but also
preserve an ecosystem. Placing a dollar value on the preservation of an
ecosystem is illusory. No one can quantify the value of a potential medicine
or a potential strain of fruit or vegetable that might be hiding in the great,
biologically diverse tropical ecosystems of the planet. But the value of an
RDU when compared with an AAU should reflect this discrepancy in some
way to better incentivize avoiding REDD emissions.
Under conventional emissions trading, Annex I nations typically award
their allotted AAUs to their domestic industries for free. In the future,
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Annex I nations should be required to auction their AAUs off to their
industries. This would raise the value of all emissions-trading units. But,
assuming that RDUs are not auctioned, this would increase the rate of return
for RDUs relative to AAUs. Designing the emissions market in this way
gives an advantage to the holder of an RDU, thereby accounting, to some
degree, for the tremendous environmental services that an RDU represents.

CONCLUSION
New thinking and creativity are desperately needed. Market designs
frequently betray a hierarchy of value placed on the competing policies, so
that one policy goal is advanced at the expense of another. However, an
emissions market that is just, practical, and effective can be conceived. The
salient features of the future emissions market should include: (1) cash
payments to REDD countries for the carbon removal achieved by their
tropical carbon sinks, (2) an action target style capping method for RDUs,
and (3) compulsory auctioning of AAUs to industrial emitters. Since it is
incentive-based, emissions trading is an appropriate response to global
climate change in an international arena where command and control would
be unenforceable. Emissions trading is also appropriate because it mitigates
the economic costs of reducing GHG emissions most effectively when
applied to large geographical regions. But the conventional emissionstrading market is roughly hewn and unsuited for emissions trading with
Non-Annex I nations.
By including Non-Annex I nations in emissions trading through REDD,
the international community can dramatically reduce the environmental
damage of climate change and the attendant human suffering that it entails.
However, the competing policies of economic efficiency, environmental
justice, and environmental effectiveness must be given appropriate weight
as we design the emissions market of the future. With these policy
objectives in mind, policymakers can begin to shape a new market where
poor nations can acquire the needed capital to gain access to the market in
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exchange for their environmental services; and where wealthy nations can
continue to reap the tremendous environmental benefits flowing from
developing nations while simultaneously mitigating the economic costs of
their commitments more efficiently.
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